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SPRINGBOKS AT THE SOMME: THE MAKING OF DELVILLE WOODf 1916
In late-June 1916, Private James Ross of the 1st South
African Infantry Brigade's 4th Regiment, South African
Scottish, added a postscript to a letter despatched home to
Cape Town from Sailly le Sec in the Picardy countryside.
His mind and spirit instinctively forfeit to the green and
tawny fields of northern France, *surely the neatest part of
the globe', he wrote to his parents, *what impresses me most
here is the colour ... the red of the poppies is
breathtaking, and truly indescribable.'1 At this distance,
Ross's observation seems almost a moment of providential
suspension; until present and future merged, he seemed
blithely unaware that the grassy realm around him was a
poisoned pastoral.
Near Corbie, further along the British Fourth Army's line, a
resting fellow soldier, John Kilgour Parker, enjoyed a brisk
sluicing in the Somme before idling away the 25th June,
admiring the pipe bands of the 9th Division Black Watch or
taking himself off to the sinewy challenge of tossing the
caber against men of the 3rd Transvaal and Rhodesia
Regiment. Aware of the incongruity of his tranquil reserve
situation as the war closed in upon the recently-arrived
South African contingent, Kilgour Parker was made edgy by
the interminable din of the massive British* artillery
bombardment of German defences, reflecting, 'so much for
this comic fireworks war. I suppose that if we took things
seriously, our nerves would probably go in a month'.2 Yet
things were very soon to be taken seriously, and men like
Ross and Kilgour Parker would then find themselves advancing
to the very border of their human sanity. For not far ahead
lay the terrifying resolution of the Somme offensive, and in
particular the perforating shock of Delville Wood for South
African forces.
In terms of the Union of South Africa's imperial war
commitment, it was natural that a volunteer Infantry Brigade
should find itself in the Sorame sector of the Western Front,
there to add to the concentration of British forces for July
1916 offensive operations. *Let us do our duty according to
our best lights ... Botha and I are not the men to desert
England at this dark hour,' Jan Smuts had signalled to
Arthur Gillett as early as September 1914.3 By this he
meant rescuing South Africans to be at Britain's side not
just in East or South West Africa, but everywhere, thereby
consolidating Dominion statehood. By mid-1915, for Smuts,
Louis Botha and others in Pretoria's military command, there
were no longer any serious doubts about the resilience of
South Africa's own wartime position and its capacity to
spare troops for overseas service: the spluttering 1914-
1915 republican Afrikaner rebellion had been snuffed out,
and the rapid conquest of German South West Africa had
landed the Union a territory larger than Germany itself, for
pretty trifling battlefield losses. So, by July 1915, South
Africa could comfortably raise white soldiers for the
European front, its offer of trained and skilled troops
readily accepted by Imperial authorities. And, while the
1st Infantry Brigade may have been the smallest4 of the
Dominion contingents despatched to France, in the Union's
pro-war English press this was sometimes seen as merely
underlining the selectively compact virility and pleasingly
well-bred manliness of South Africa's fighting
contribution.5
Furthermore, for the fit and well-educated white social
elite which made up the lion's share of the 1st Brigade, to
be on the Western Front was the ideal imagined form of
valiant armed expedition abroad - to work and to war where
the military contest really mattered, amidst the soldier-
knight aura of an embattled European habitat. Some, like
Sergeant James Herbert Quinn, even saw themselves as
returning emissaries of the nineteenth century colonial
'civilising mission', their honourable destiny to purge
Europe of a repellent German barbarity. 'In the old days,'
crowed Quinn, 'people set out for Darkest Africa to civilise
the country. Well, it is high time somebody from South
Africa set out here to civilise Prussia's Darkest Europe.'6
Individual experience in prior post-1914 theatres of war
seems to have greatly reinforced the inclination to view
1916 arrival at the Western Front, *at last, further
afield', as an engagement with ^nobler work'.7 The
disarming ease of the German South West Africa invasion had
made combat undertakings there seem ephemeral, almost a
tatty, sub-colonial interruption to proper "high calibre
soldiering. For those officers from Johannesburg's King
Edward VII School given to playing veldt aphorisms, in
*German South West' they 'had done their bit', but 'team
spirit awaited greater challenges than awful African sand'.8
Being 'shot in the German West African campaign' was, as
Private E.G. Kensit explained, 'a very slight irritation',
but once fully recovered he was %looking forward to the
time' when he would be * fighting properly in the trenches of
Europe'*.9 Commentators in Britain also pursued this theme.
Thus, the Royal Colonial Institute's United Empire observed
with satisfaction that South Africa's patriots could now at
last anticipate a momentous and regenerating 'clean fight',
on 'the battle-fields of Europe'.10
Evidence is equally clear that early 1916 service for the
South African Brigade in Egypt, and light engagements with
Turkish forces in the Western Desert, was not exactly
considered to be the stuff of Arabian military epic: what
loomed largest was the wearing experience of flies, filth,
illimitable sand, and regular outbursts of racist spleen
against 'the Gyppo'11 or 'vile', Uow' or 'foul' Turkish
opponents.12 Surveying this mediocre war, the South African
infantryman had little cause to doubt that he remained
master of his own superior breeding and survival.
After this thin combat time, the South African Brigade's
arrival from Alexandria in Marseilles in April provided a
positively exhilarating moment. During a short period of
rest and reserve outside Marseilles, the South Africans'
favourite white schoolboy indulgence in clowning about and
blackening up as Africans, through the imaginative
investment of a mock 'Zulu warrior' posture, was reported to
have made them 'the talk of Paris'.13 The 'Springboks' of
Brigadier-General Henry Timson Lukin's settler iffip-i quickly
earned a reputation, according to the Natal Witness, for
fabricating fearsome * Zulu war cries .., the first time ever
in France such a frighteningly barbaric noise was heard.'14
Conspicuously kilted South African Scots or *Jocks' were
also given to toasting themselves as *Scotland for Ever' or
as *bonnie Highland lads' in xZulu Gaelic', *Basuto Gaelic'
or *Matabele Gaelic' (apparently rendered as *Ena palilx,
Zomkie palili mangle').** The *Zulu Springbok' image
perhaps offered South African soldiers a picturesque public
identity in France, distinguishing their bearing from the
demeanour of other Dominion and British combatants. At the
same time, it was also an unlikely emblem of a mongrel white
South Africanness, one part fictive Celtic warrior, another,
strong and graceful buck, and a third, axiomatic soldierly
Zulu-worship. There is more than a little irony in the wry
conclusion of one Overseas Contingent Private that three-
quarters of the French and Belgian civilians encountered
1thought South Africans should be black men anyway'.16 The
apparent tumult of le Zulu blanc seems also to have touched
the ears of the British senior officer corps, not least
those worthies who had served in the South African War.
Around Easter, Henry Rawlinson, Herbert Plumer and Douglas
Haig undertook courtesy inspections, the last especially
remembered by Private Ernest Solomon for his kindly face and
reassuring manner.17
Many elements, other than a fondness for boorish racial
parody, contributed to the distinctive soldiering character
of the 1st South African Infantry. Some of these, such as
Anglo-Saxon or Anglo-Celtic race pride. Empire loyalist
fervour, and popular militarism, were present generally in
the ranks of British and Dominion troops, as has been so
suggestively shown by J.G. Fuller.18 But other
consolidating traits had a more inward Union pedigree. An
all-volunteer body, the 5 800-strong Brigade's four
battalions were thoroughly 'nationalised', not merely
through considerable cross-drafting, but through the
intermingling 'Jocks' influence of shared associational ties
to the Transvaal Scottish, Cape Town Highlanders, and the
Union's tartan rash of urban and rural Caledonian societies.
Linguistically, the contingent was overwhelmingly English or
bilingual Anglo-Afrikaner; the proportional enrolment of
actual Dutch-Afrikaans speakers was no more than around ten
to fifteen percent. Birthplace provided another bedrock of
identity. Just over half of these combatants were 'British-
born', fitting together with a 'colonial-born' balance of
Robbs, Rawbones and Reids as neatly as the two halves of a
tally of empire loyalism.
Furthermore, the South African contingent was remarkably
homogenous in its breezy middle class configuration, with
very many of its recruits the patrician products of a well-
endowed college ethos schooling, fused together by mainly
Anglican and Presbyterian Christianity, well-connected
family ties, kinship, shared social codes, and the boozy
milieu of the rugby-dinner chorus.19 In the inimitable
words of the awestruck John Buchan, official historian of
the South African Brigade, its *level of education and
breeding was singularly high'.20 This recognition of its
wartime class character has been echoed recently by Peter
Digby, who concludes that the men who opted for service in
France were *of a particularly fine type ... businessmen,
civil servants, academics, students, ... ' . 2 1
Finally, in addition to sports-driven physical rigour,
springy morale and white collar comradeship, the 1st South
African Infantry was a weighty depository of previous
military experience. Some eighty percent of its recruits
recorded military training or some form of pre-war armed
service.22 Indeed, it could hardly have been otherwise. In
white farming areas of the Eastern Cape and Natal, for
example, the array of shooting clubs, militia corps and
rifle associations helped foster gun proficiency. Equally,
every recruit who had been schooled between the turn of the
century and the formation of the Overseas Contingent in 1915
would invariably have had musketry training, commando field
exercises, first-aid and drill as a member of their School
Cadet Detachment. And, unlike many School Corps of British
public schools which, according to Jonathan Gathorne-Hardy
had * little or no direct or serious connection with the
army'23 before the immediate pre-1914 crisis years, pupils
in South Africa's leading boys' schools had an established
familiarity with regular, mobile, colonial soldiering.
Selborne Cadets, for instance, had been an active component
of the Kaffrarian Rifles since the mid-l880s; similarly,
Maritzburg College Cadet Detachment had been affiliated to
the Royal Natal Carbineers since the early 1870s.24 Other
active service experience spanned the South African War and
naturally the German South West Africa commando operation,
in which sixty percent2^ of the Brigade's enrolment was
involved. A number of older and higher-ranking volunteers
were also veterans of late-nineteenth century Zululand,
Bechuanaland, and Matabeleland wars of colonial
pacification. The most prominent of these was the Brigade
Commander himself, Brigadier-General Henry Timson Lukin,
whose shift from dispersing lightly-armed peasants to
mutually advanced industrial slaughter, was to be chronicled
adoringly in his posthumous 1926 biography, Ulundi to
Delville Wood..26 On top of all this, the entire 1st South
African Infantry had obviously been immersed very recently
in North African combat which involved prolonged marching,
frontal rushes at the enemy, and securing extended lines of
desert communication.
Apart from the command certainties of inter-regimental
integration, disciplined self-reliance, and that enigmatic
Equality of initiative which distinguished Scots and
Dominion troops alike',27 how much of this military credit
was to be directly helpful to Lukin's contingent in the
execution of its offensive role on the Somme? Not much.
While African combat requirements enabled Union infantry to
get their teeth into highly mobile warfare across open
country, a 'war of movement' lubricated by individual
initiative and enterprise, the fortified stalemate of mid-
1916 trench warfare provided industrial conditions ^totally
alien to their mode of fighting'.28
What emerges quite clearly is that while educated South
African volunteer infantry understood in the most general
sense that the Western Front would be a more *real' a
'greater', 'tough' or 'stiff'29 sort of war, their knowledge
of the grisly realities of European mass warfare was very
limited, and their conceptions of combat persistently that
of brave individual endeavour and a favourable outcome.
Within South Africa, the costs of the First Battle of Ypres,
and Verdun, had not been chilling news stories. A further
consideration is that prior to the Somme campaign, there
seems to have been relatively little European battlefield
news sent home by Union soldiers. What there was, mostly
from a peppering of officers drafted into British regiments
in 1914-1915, was well characterised by a Coldstream Guards
Lieutenant, W.B. St Leger, who in late-1915 concentrated
brightly on the way in which the *great reputation', 'good
name' and *conduct in action' of South African troops was
*appreciated by the Imperial soldiers, who were proud to
have them as comrades in the continuing great fight'.30
Another officer, Lieutenant E.H. Smith of the Royal Scots
Fusiliers reported from Flanders, 'as yet I've had no
feeling of fear, in fact I rather like the business as it is
novel, but in spite of that everything seems prosaic and
ordinary ... I've only seen one casualty or two and the
effects of shell fire on inanimate objects ... every day I
continue to ask if there really is a war on.'31 And where
that casualty, at Ypres perhaps, or Neuve Chapelle, happened
to be a South African soldier, in all these amounted to few.
And whether in Cape Town or Johannesburg, the response to
such deaths was fairly muted and confined to kin, friends,
neighbourhood, church and school. Before the Somme, South
Africans were yet to die nationally in the war, in any
outwardly expressive sense.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the minds of Infantry Brigade
soldiers contained scant anticipation of a war of death,
dismemberment, and suffering through their initial April,
May and June months on the Western Front. In any event, the
enemy remained mostly invisible. In this brooding
atmosphere, regimental officers and privates alike continued
to plot the fields of Edwardian client, their ludicrous
language of sporting encounter a reflection of the driving
force through which the First Under Eighteen of Durban or
Kimberley imagined their rush into combat with Pan-German
marauders. Letters home were liberally littered with
typical references to the * sphere of unselfishness' or
'soldierly charity'32 of Britain's Ally, and to the moral
courage stimulated by participation in physically testing
games.
In their conception of a coming Somme offensive as a
boisterous * scrap' or * scraps' with the enemy, or a
*clobbering o f or *clear run'33 against the Germans, the
sons of the Anglo-South African gentry seemed to mirror the
'schoolboy fight' idiom and sense of the individualised,
psychological battlefield, still held by British General
Staff in 1915-16, and explored so suggestively by Tim
Travers.34 While these imagined Dominion masculinities
provided a pervasive outlook, it is also important to note
that this was punctuated occasionally during Western Front
training by more wry or sardonic attitudes towards war. For
instance, Sergeant D.H. Kotze of the 3rd Battalion mused:
So here I am, six thousand miles away in company
of a few thousand other misguided youths...we
spend our days in the pursuit of military wisdom,
and our nights in the pursuit of sleep...now we
South Africans are in hard training for the Great
Advance. A bombing officer will tell us that
bombs are the heaven-sent means of sending Germans
to the other place, and the only possible things
to win the war with. But a musketry officer says
the same thing...finally a gallant Captain of the
Bedfords who returned from Ypres minus an elbow
and plus a military cross puts his money on
artillery tactics. So altogether, we dear old
Africa boys get rather mixed up."
For May and June, the Brigade scraped along in such a way,
doing fatigues, carrying munitions and other equipment,
receiving instruction in bombing, signalling, bayonet combat
and the use of Lewis guns, in addition to complete regiments
bolting through mock attacks. The onset of front line
duties and alternating close relief support soon brushed
aside fancies about trench warfare as epiphany with the
civilising culture of European battlefields.
In fact, soldiers' recollections of time in trench working
parties are full of bored contempt for punishing drudgery.
They add a South African streak to an already familiar
Western Front picture of resentful men feeling that they
were having to scrabble about like rabbit-warren primitives,
* living', to quote from Eric Leed's argument, *a
precivilized life that had little in common with any
industrialized, technological environment'.^^ But South
African grumbling over trench line assignments also had a
particularly contagious form of colonial social expression.
Jolted by a Western Front work burden that did not entirely
square with expectations, infantrymen nursed a sense of
being declassed or socially degraded by heavy manual work,
asserting their indignation at having to do xNative work',
or to %slave like zwaartes' (blacks). As Private Norman
Kernick wrote of trench work at Maricourt, *we had to work
like kaffirs to get things into fighting trim and the
fellows considered this no joke'. For another man,
Britain's XIII Corps had need of appropriate education, %it
looks as if the British Army should spend a few days in
Durban or Johannesburg to learn about garden boys'. '
Still somewhat peevish about the full reward of labour in
northern France, a fully assembled 1st Brigade was mobilised
to take up position near Bray-sur-Somme on 30 June. Private
Joseph Samuels (Rand Rifles), possibly the last living
survivor of the Battle of Delville Wood, recalls men being
perplexed at being told to march into the vicinity of
British trenches, *but then we were instructed to camp out
in the open veldt and to keep on our battle kit. They
didn't give us any blankets ... we didn't know what was
going on, being stuck out there in the open. Of course, the
next day, we could see damn quickly what was going on.'-*°
At the start of the Battle of the Somme, Lukin's Brigade was
attached to the densely Scottish 9th Division, which in turn
formed part of General Sir Walter Congreve's XIII Corps
under General Sir Henry Rawlinson's Fourth Army Command.
The South Africans had been drafted in to replace the 28th
Brigade which had been badly battered in the 1915 Battle of
Loos.
Although there was admiration of South African morale and
discipline amongst Highlander battalions, colonial * Jocks''
and Scots did not exactly jump into bed together,contrary to
South African press reports. Men of the Seaforth, Cameron,
or Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were troubled by the
loss of a valued Brigade, *friends being taken away', and
wary *of strangers coming in'.39 Kilted South Africans who
felt xa true brotherhood' with the Black Watch or Royal
Scots instead sensed *bitterness' and *anger' at their
xbeing placed in their Division'. Full of ^Scottish pride',
commented one Cape Town Highlander, *they would hardly speak
to any of us'.40 In part, this probably reflected some
rooted class realities. Unlike the tough-minded egalitarian
affinities between 'men from the crofts and sheep stations'
which may have helped to cultivate *a similarity between
Scots and Australians',41 there would have been little
kindred structure to integrate working class Scots with the
South African Brigade's concentration of middle class
colonial ^Jocks', for whom *Scottishness' was a fondness for
a tweed and tartan African self-image. This was certainly
the drift of things at first, until appreciation of South
African courage and endurance of suffering and bloodshed on
the Somme led to a generalised respect for the 1st Brigade
from its 9th Division counterparts.
But that would come later. On the disastrous first day of
Britain's Somme offensive, Lukin's Springboks waited in
reserve in the southernmost sector (or extreme right) of the
British line, where Congreve's XIII Corps achieved the most
successful of all Fourth Army advances, taking the German
front line before midday. Rawlinson did not, however, push
on beyond captured ground, in part because the major
campaign objectives lay in the stalled centre of the front
rather than on the right, and partly because the tactical
conception of the whole Somme offensive lay in the execution
of an incremental advance, through the *bite and hold'
notion of simply capturing enemy front line trenches, and
then consolidating to beat off counter-attacks.42 It would
be difficult to find a more perfect instance of an infanty
offensive based on loitering with intent. Rawlinson's
failure to exploit Congreve's successful penetration of 1
July allowed the Germans to reinforce their shaky sector.
With the Fourth Army's commander *concerned about enemy
counter-attacks driving his army from captured strong
points',43 the reserve South African contingent moved
forward on 3 July to stiffen front line positions and in
particular to secure the captured Bernafay Wood. This
battle area was being heavily shelled by artillery located
on the German second line, on the rising ground of the
Longueval-Bazentin le Petit ridge. For ten days, Brigade
infantry held Bernafay under constant shelling before being
relieved by other 9th Division forces. By then, the *Boys
of Africa' had discovered that war on the Somme would not
be, to quote one of their number, xa Big Push to bag some
Germans ... This was not going to be the clean job we had
expected. Fritz put out curtain fire, and we realised this
was war'.44 Since 1 July the Brigade had suffered almost 1
000 casualties across all ranks, mainly by bombardment. Its
Anglican chaplain, perceiving cases of shell shock and
worried about maintaining direct command with the loss of
numerous NCOs and officers, issued extra chocolate rations
to fortify men against breakdown.
While this grinding ordeal unfolded, British battle
calculations took a turn which was to have shattering
consequences for the 9th Division South Africans by mid-
July. Following the disaster of almost 60 000 British
casualties on the first day of battle, the need to recover
and press on meant that the *only question facing the
command was where to resume the Somme offensive'.45 In
deciding this, it was Field Marshal sir Douglas Haig who in
a sense personally delivered the South African Brigade into
the history of the Great War and the making of a white
Dominion nationhood. Brushing aside the inclinations of
Rawlinson and also those of Joseph Joffre, the French
Commander-in-Chief, for a renewed thrust in the centre of
the front, Haig pressed for an attack in the south where,
for the XIII Corps, ^success had been gained'.46
Rawlinson framed an offensive on the right against the
German second line, an attack which would strike at
Longueval village and Delville Wood. Haig's precondition of
clearing away flanking enemy footholds dictated the first
step, the rolling up of Bernafay, Trones and Mametz Woods
which were south of, and below, Delville Wood. Following
repeated scrappy attacks by tired troops who sustained heavy
losses, by 13 July Mametz Wood on the left and Trones Wood
on the right were under partial and precarious British
control. At this point, Rawlinson felt able to commence a
dawn 14 July offensive against the German second line,
bearing upon four miles of front just south of Pozieres to
Longueval and Delville Wood. Brigades of the 9th Division
were to seize the village and then overrun Delville Wood.
%To the SA Brigade', writes Peter Digby, %all this was a
mere continuation of the Somme offensive7.47 Down in the
lower ranks, Joseph Samuels remembers, *standing around in
the dark, none of us knowing where we were, or where we
would be going'48: world of the seen, world of the unseen.
Soldiers who had seen Trones and Bernafay Woods shredded by
German artillery were now perturbed by a distinct sense of
uncertainty about their survival prospects. Yet no-one
could have known quite how short were the odds against
cheating death or wounding.
Because of its still limited experience of trench warfare,
the South African Brigade did not participate in the first
rush on Longueval; instead, its troops were 9th Division
reserve, primed to mop up after the German line had been
breached. But Longueval proved an unexpectedly tough nut to
crack. The German Commander-in-Chief, General Erich von
Falkenhayn, had made no retreat an end in itself, declaring,
*nur uber leichen darf der feind seinen weg vorwarts
finden!' (the enemy shall not advance except over corpses).
The ferocity of German defences both delayed the planned
advance on Delville Wood, and inflicted severe casualties on
attacking Highlanders. Scrambling to regain momentum.
Division Command was obliged to deploy a battalion of its
South African reserve to reinforce its flagging offensive.
With Longueval sufficiently entrenched in British hands by
nightfall on the 14th, three of the four battalions of the
1st Infantry were ordered to capture Delville Wood *at all
costs',49 at dawn on 15 July, and then to consolidate and
widen the breach in the enemy area.
Delville Wood turned out to be as formidable an objective as
anything in the history of the Somme campaign. As Buchan
rightly recorded, the immediate battlefield environs of *the
wood of Delville' presented *an intricate problem'. Chalky
soil, thick with knotted roots and laced with branches, was
less than ideal for quick entrenchment. *The Germans knew
every inch of that ground', reported Lance-Corpora1 Ronald
Rawbone, *they knocked the trenches to pieces'.50 A rattled
Henry veale observed *going through woods where every tree
seemed to hold a sniper'.51 Moreover, *like most French
woods', Delville was expansively xseamed with grassy rides,
partly obscured by scrub, and the Germans had dug lines of
trenches along and athwart them'.52 To add to the
dauntingly raised terrain confronting advancing troops,
Delville Wood was also roughly triangular in shape, enabling
its occupying 10th Bavarian Division Germans to direct
artillery, enfilade machine gun and rifle fire on to any
attacking force from three sides.
For some hours, the South African Brigade achieved fairly
rapid penetration, joined by Seaforth^and Gordon Highlanders
to form a groping Gaelic vanguard which had dubbed the
Delville Wood rides in which it entrenched. Princes,
Buchanan, Bond, Strand and Regent Street, and Rotten Row.
Here, a Union infantry prong secured both the ground and a
shared metropolitan identity. With swirling roots and thick
bracken hampering the digging of trenches, many men took
over trenches and dugouts from which Germans had withdrawn.
These were not destined to provide for their keep. Their
precise locations were known to German artillery direction.
At first, resisting Germans continued to fall back across
successively bloodied trench lines, and then dug in in a
northwest corner. But their sector commander, General Sixt
von Arnim, was utterly determined to recapture lost
territory, also *at all costs'.53 He launched a wave of
battalion-strength counter-attacks, preceded by massive
artillery bombardments commencing on 16 July, which incurred
a harrowing toll of South African casualties. Most
terrifying, all battle records agree, was the relentless
shelling from three sides, the *hurricane of shells that
swept Delville Wood', in the words of Major John Ewing,
official historian of the 9th Division.54
xThe wood', wrote Private Victor Casson of the Brigade's 1st
Battalion, xwas subjected to a rain of shell fire, the whole
wood appeared to be hit by an earthquake. The wood heaved
and shook, blowing up trees and men. Mutilated bodies lay
everywhere. The dying and the maimed were calling out for
10
water and help - but there was none to be had. It rained
hell-fire and steel'.55 To Trooper Gerald Dicey, 'every
shell buried fellows, dead and dying. The Boche made the
woods resemble a ploughed funeral field.'56 German
estimates reveal that through one night of sustained
artillery attack, that of 17 July, over 20,000 shells rained
down on the area of Delville Wood then held by the prostrate
Brigade, a withering square patch of approximately 1,000 by
1,200 square yards. At times, their near unceasing descent
reached the rate of 400 per minute.57 Those who had thought
to find the Western Front a soul-stirring trial of South
African 'manhood' instead discovered it to be more like an
antechamber of hell.
In the shuddering landscape of the Sorame, shelling in the
battle of *Devil's Wood' or 'Nightmare Wood' (as it quickly
came to be called by both British and German sides)
undoubtedly represented a frightful pinnacle, 'the
bloodiest', to quote Basil Liddell Hart, 'battle-hell of
1916'.58 On 18 July, the pulverising 186-gun German
bombardment ceased, and nine Bavarian battalions vaulted out
of their trenches and stormed into the southwest corner of
the now incandescent wood, expecting to brush aside any
lingering resistance to their regaining a hold on Delville.
Instead, they ran into the barely-coordinated remnants of a
concussed Brigade which, amidst carnage said later by
British medical officers xto be the worst that they had ever
experienced',59 were nevertheless in no mood to be dislodged
from beleaguered positions. A series of ferociously-fought
encounters, which often saw rifles jettisoned for bayonets,
witnessed wave upon wave of attacking Germans repulsed.
Preceded by German shell, mortar, gas, machine gun and rifle
fire, the frenzied close combat of these stages of the
Delville Wood battle, with individual soldiers and isolated
groups of disorientated South Africans and Germans falling
savagely upon one another, was termed, with understandable
hyperbole, 'indescribable' madness and total chaos by the
historian of the German 52nd Infantry, and judged *extremely
terrible' in the official German history of the Delville
Wood battle.60 The perception of Delville Wood madness or
wildness in German chronicles lay in the sheer
horrendousness of free-for-all conditions with mounting
casualties of both sides lying unprotected and untended, as
fighting men at the outer limits of human endurance hacked
at one another with bayonets or clubbed away with rifle
butts. With a complete breakdown in some areas of
observation postings, signals, and telephone or runner
(these picked off by sniper) communications, Brigade
storming parties on the southern and eastern perimeters of
the wood were rattled by their inability to obtain firm
identification of advancing troops. While 'much troubled as
to who were we fighting, possibly French rather than
Huns',61 some platoons let fly at any groups of soldiers
prowling the edge of the woodland, 'waiting was just a risk,
in our situation then it was kill or die'.62 'The wood',
reported one German officer who on 18 July found the site a
hot and clammy slaughter house, 'was a wasteland of
shattered trees, charred and burning stumps, craters thick
with mud and blood, and corpses, corpses, corpses,
everywhere. In places they were piled four deep. Worst of
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all was the lowing of the wounded. It sounded like a cattle
ring at the spring fair'-63
Eventually, surviving South African infantry regrouped under
Lieutenant-Colonel E.F. Thackeray, commanding officer of the
3rd Regiment, and established defensive works near the
centre of the wood, across the intersection of the Buchanan
Street and Rotten Row rides. There, through 19 and 20 July,
what was left of the tattered Brigade fought on desperately
to deny assaulting German infantry possession of the wood,
with Thackeray's rising trench losses added to by
dismayingly inaccurate British counter-artillery barrage.
As shells from their own lines now hit South African
positions, suffocating the wounded with soil, and
dismembering or burying huddled men, an increasingly
distraught Thackeray despatched that his casualties were
*becoming beyond endurance ...I cannot evacuate my
critically wounded or bury my dead on account of snipers ..
so far the SAI have held on but I feel the strain is
becoming too much'.64 Those few Company lieutenants still
in the saddle on the edges of Thackeray's strong point
repeatedly declared their positions * impossible' or
^untenable', worried by gaps in their front, thin lines of
men collapsing from exhaustion, and tormented by the lack of
stretchers and field dressings for the wounded, *all used up
... they are dying for want of treatment'.65 Lance-Corporal
Rowland Key, coining upon a blown-in dressing station, caught
these hours of haphazard slaughter, the post *set on fire,
several poor, badly-wounded fellows were burning to death
... such carnage, enough to turn anybody's brain'.66
By now, British reinforcements were at last ready to
assemble and relieve the haggard South African force. In
the evening of 20 July, after six days and five nights of
crucifying combat, reinforcing infantry (Suffolks and
Norfolks, with Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and other
Scottish battalions) arrived to take over the embattled
Brigade position and to pipe the ^heroic survivors of the
South African Brigade'67 from the Delville Wood wasteland
and out through Longueval. This withdrawal did not mean
that South African infantry had been knocked out of the
Somme campaign; a reconstituted Brigade fought on,
elsewhere. It took a further six weeks of grinding British
effort to clear and secure the whole of *Devil's Wood'.
In the overall movement of the Delville Wood battle, as
Peter Liddle has concluded, *between July and 3 September,
South African units, above all, were involved in the
progressive capture, consolidation, and retention of
Delville Wood'.68 And in this view, all other British
military histories of the Somme are equally clear that
Delville Wood was done in South Africa's name, through an
unprecedented discharge of courage, sacrifice, and endurance
which left both allies and adversaries in awe.69 Here, and
beyond, suggests Trevor Wilson in his magisterial The Myriad
Faces of War, the ^contribution to the ensuing phases of the
Somme campaign' of South Africa's colonial force *would
become legendary'.70
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Judgement of the actual British tactical effectiveness of
the Delville Wood engagement is more mixed. For Digby and
Uys, the 1st Brigade's taking and holding of large parts of
the forest represented a momentous consolidated
breakthrough, ensuring that the *second stage of the Somme
offensive in this section of the front was secure'.71 In a
more modest overall appraisal of the Somme campaign, Wilson
would see the Delville Wood achievement as one episode in a
plodding, xbit by bit' British advance - an army bleeding
profusely, but pressing inexorably upwards.72 Travers, on
the other hand, is all astringent scepticism. Not only were
continuing late-July attacks on Delville Wood horribly
botched because of inadequate General Headquarters and
Fourth Army planning; their costly consequences were
rendered all the more bleak by prior ^general complaint that
there was no point in taking Longueval and Delville Wood at
this time because they were overlooked by enemy-held higher
ground' (High Wood) and would in any event only create a
vulnerable salient. * Indeed', argues Travers, if Delville
Wood continued to be contested through August, this was
^mainly it would seem, to straighten out the line'.73
Whatever the military interpretation, the human cost.of the
Delville Wood action was immense. Brigade strength at entry
on 15 July had stood at 3,153 men - 121 officers and 3,032
troops of other ranks. Six days later, its active
complement had been whittled down to 720 - eighteen officers
and 702 other ranks. Total battle casualties totalled 2,536
killed, missing presumed dead, wounded or captured. It took
Brigade burial parties, assisted by Indian Cavalry Ambulance
Corps bearers, weeks to recover and inter the dead; only 151
reasonably intact bodies were eventually recovered, of which
just eighty-one could be properly identified. The tattered
shreds of a further six hundred or so unidentified Brigade
soldiers lay scattered anonymously in Longueval and Delville
Wood. In the heat of late-August, a visiting Field
Artillery Officer, Lieutenant I.R.H. Probert, recorded how
his stomach heaved at the smell of wet, decaying vegetation,
excrement, urine, and scraps of putrifying flesh, as
Delville Wood was still *full of dead and smells
terribly.'75 John Masefield, tramping Delville Wood four
months after the end of the Battle of the Somme, remarked on
how the dead still lay three or four deep and the
bluebottles made their faces black'.76 Horror gripped many
other onlookers. Surveying the craters, blasted trench
emplacements, dugouts and choked communication ways through
the undergrowth, an unhinged 3rd South African Infantry
Anglican chaplain recoiled from the almost inexpressible, a
black confrontation with *bad places, pits of horror'.77
After the Somme, Eustace St Clair Hill could not escape a
raw sense of the war as a moral abomination. Leaving
Longueval on 23rd July, he confessed candidly to his St
John's College headmaster that his Delville Wood experience
had made him wonder about the idea of war as a painful
necessity; now seeing it as a savage education, he hoped
that *this war goes on and on until men loathe war and
determine forever to give it up as an unchristian, damnable
method of settling disputes'.78
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Appalled by the scale of the Delville Wood slaughter,
Brigade infantry expressed their feelings in letters filled
with outraged sensibility and shaded by awareness of
tragedy: while not entirely supplanted, the cacophony of
Springbok glory and invincibility became a more minor
descant. Astonishingly, some English school journals
carried later-1916 Delville Wood correspondence from France
which reported soldiers' experiences with remarkably brutal
honesty, a discourse of agony which cracked the banality of
sacrificial glory which these self-same publications
paradoxically still continued to reflect. *I've seen enough
- shattered bodies, bloodstained heroes, dead, dying, shot
and shell, a very hell let loose', concluded one Private in
his South African College Magazine.79 Another, with
Delville Wood now the forest of his mind, despatched an
obituary note on one Ben Auret, *hard lines, cut up like the
trees ... of Auret we have been able to gather nothing more
than his name as he is no longer whole'.80
The physical and psychological scalping of the Delville Wood
experience produced intense and constant allusions to heat,
to horrific death, and to victimhood as a balm to sickened
spirits. * Devil's Wood' had been a *hot place', a
* scorching patch', an *unbearable furnace', or 'the heat of
hell'; inevitably, it was also likened to South Africa's
most characteristically arid and coppery regions, hotter
than xthe Karoo' or *the highveldt'.B1 European soil had
been relentlessly unyielding. The constant sight of broken
bodies pervaded infantrymen's personal accounts, identifying
the grotesque with hypnotic compulsion: %beastly sights ...
unbelievable carnage, enough to turn anybody', reported
Private Kenneth Earp, *men's limbs blown all over our
trench. One of our sergeants was hit in the face by another
man's head, cut off by a piece of aerial torpedo. The
Bosches had an awful time also. We saw bits of arms and
legs going up, and once I saw a naked trunk, slit right down
the middle ... it simply makes you weep'. Earp indeed
recalled seeing an officer ^blubbing like a child in sheer
hysterics'.82
A third factor was an often expansive expression of common
humanity, springing from that coagulating * awareness that
soldiers in the trenches opposite were similarly
victimized'.83 Before the horror of the Sorame, there had
been few respectful South African infantry feelings for the
Germans, and even less occasion for them. Now, generally
speaking, Delville Wood left some sense of compassionate
recognition of German dead. In an eastern strip of the
wood, *as bare as the Karoo', Private Rowland Key knocked up
xa little wooden cross' above a German sniper buried by an
exploding shell, *some poor fighter, striving as we are for
home and beauty'.84 Repelled by *bits of bodies that lie
all over the place', a mordant Lance-Corporal Henry Clark
declared it *a shame that men who have fought for their
country can't have a decent burial, whoever they are. They
will most likely be posted up as "an unknown British or
German Hero afterwards"'.85 When it came to the unknown
soldier, the psalm-loving Reverend J.H. Whaits was a
practical and reflective man. Having tramped Delville Wood
in search of Private Lawrence Immelman, ^missing since the
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fight', Whaits advised his parents that their son had
probably been buried 'by a comrade subsequently killed, and
so unable to tell where'. Conveying to the Immelmans his
sorrow at the sight of so many victims of the Delville Wood
terror, Whaits suggested a universal Christian honouring of
the dead, 'One Big Calvary with names on its base should be
erected after Peace, to commemorate all who lie there'.86
Back in the Union of South Africa, certainly in empire
loyalist white civilian responses to news of Delville Wood,
there was little room for public nightmare or
faintheartedness: passions were too high and conviction too
deep. Reporting in late-July that *total casualties for
Lukin's brigade is less than 5%', the Diamond Fields
Advertiser exulted in a South African xFirst Blood' on the
Somme, nearly all of it German.87 Delville Wood became for
many other papers the immediate symbol of Springbok tenacity
and heroism in France, observing the Brigade's 'brilliant
work', 'prowess in Delville Wood', * imperishable heroism',
and crowing over 'Springboks' splendid' or 'matchless'
'stand'. Even when the full scale of Delville Wood
casualties became clear, the Union's pro-war press did not
grow less euphoric. Indeed, it made a great deal of these:
of the fact that South African patriots were not the kind of
people to be discouraged by losses from continuing 'the
Great Battle of Right against Wrong'. This was one of the
marks of their 'race', continuing essential war business,
*unflinching' and 'unbowed'.88 In its more sober moments,
the Weekly Telegraph dwelt upon a Garibaldi spirit stalking
Delville Wood, with 'Our Boys' responding anew to the
remembered spirit of his patriotic challenge of 'forced
marches, short rations, bloody battles, wounds,
imprisonment, and death'.89
For the rest of 1916, Delville Wood left behind it a further
distinct cluster of eulogizing echoes. One immediate impact
on South Africa's home front was shaped by the cadet
territorial codes and masculine character-building of the
1st Brigade's important school recruiting grounds. College
chaplains published accounts from the Western Front
extolling the fighting qualities of Delville Wood's South
Africans in their local parish magazines. Their militant
tone was simultaneously reflected by many of the schools'
own publications which, in magazines such as The St Andrian
and The Selbornian. also turned editorial comment over
exclusively to the conventional repertoire of noble war
sacrifice. 'Gallant lives and noble deaths', was the
dominant, no-nonsense idiom of The South African College
Magazinef which invoked Delville Wood as the heroism of
disciplined endurance and of sticking to one another, not
least through the exceptional banality of its SACS Old Boy
Obituaries: thus. Lieutenants William Nimmo Brown
('splendidly trained') and Vaughan 'Toby' Noaks ('a good
fellow off the field') vindicated a patriotic English white
South African schooling.90
July 1916 casualty lists also drew dashing British
responses. United Empire, journal of the Royal Colonial
Institute, marked the loss of two fellows, former masters of
St Andrew's College, Johannesburg (which in 1915 had
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despatched over 500 xst Andrians' to the Brigade) as manhood
selflessly sacrificed in xone of the most heroic defences
ever known in the whole history of war'-91 Beyond this, a
surfeit of fairly dire student verse celebrated Springbok
transcendance over waste and destruction. That by senior
cadets of the South African College School, Cape Town's
willowy equivalent of Melbourne's Scotch College, plumbed
quite unparalleled poetic depths, as In Delville Wood.
*charred and splintered/foul and mired/boom of guns/where
birds once choired', or At Delville Wood. *fellows finding
death and glory/on this field of battle gory'.92
A less adolescent assertion of Delville Wood as the Union's
real war initiation was the place it quickly assumed by
late-July in the educated discourse of the settler
population - in pulpit meditations, mayoral orations,
parliamentary speeches, middlebrow periodicals, and the
barrage of proud town council resolutions cabled to France,
repeatedly extolling *the gallant/heroic/ dauntless action
of our contingent'. These last emanated not just from
larger, English-dominated urban areas but also from
loyalist-influenced Cape Afrikaner small towns and rural
municipalities like Swellendam, Porterville and
Oudtshoorn.93
But it was, above all, the Union's main newspapers which
spread the essential Delville Wood message. A flinty set of
assumptions permeated the commercial press which identified
closely with Union government war policy. One spreading
theme was stoical acceptance of heavy battle casualties, as
in the sunny view of the Cape Times that losses were
*actually small when compared to the rapidity of our
advance'.9^ A perverse variation on this was to celebrate
the Delville Wood toll as a moral imperative; towards the
end of July and in early August 1916, dithering *Patriotic
Parents' were reminded that %anybody reading the casualty
list should feel ashamed for still keeping any sons back'.
The Cape Times also weighed in against remaining *slackers'
whose ^unwillingness' to join *was now dishonouring South
Africa's many fallen.95
A second response was representation of Delville Wood as a
shaken European domain, fortunate to have been calmed by an
implanted Dominion South African identity. According to the
Weekly Telegraph and Rand Daily Mail respectively, it had
become xa Springbok corner' and ^pasture of khaki gazelles',
while the Zululand Times, reporting the King's 1917 visit to
the battle scene, pointed approvingly to the way in which
welcoming *sons of the veld' had burrowed down once again to
show George V where *they had dug themselves in and made
their timeless stand' as *heroes in the history of
France.'96 Furthermore, in a distant European war in which
South Africa's white settlers were Africans and its Africans
Natives, there was heavy emphasis on the battle valour of
variously ^splendid', ^gallant', or ^toiling Africans' whose
fine xAfrican quality' had brought to the Somme xa great
epic of the Golden Cape'.97 In the mouths of some Dutch
Reformed Church clergy in the Western Cape, the rib-cage of
Afrikaner loyalism, the ideal of the ardent African son
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acquired an Afrikaans character, with- Delville Wood having
felt the mark of 'dappere' or *sterkste Afrikaners',
A third, and clearly most inflated affirmation of Delville
Wood, was dissemination of the notion of it having delivered
a mature South African nation in its own loyalist image,
encased within an empire identity. Or, as the knowing
modern historian would say, that ^imagined community' of the
nation, bound by common identity and national purpose. In
this assertion, however brutal the surgery of the Somme, the
bloodied brambles and barbed wire of Delville Wood had
imaginatively stitched together the Union's two settler
communities. Now, the sour Anglo-Boer tribal legacy of the
South African War had been sweetened, the soil of the 1916
battlefield *a fresh and pregnant seal' on the 1902 Peace of
Vereeniging. Now, too, the recent Union of 1910 had been
decisively hardened."
A forceful political idiom of Anglo-Afrikaner *race' fusion
impelled English editors and their model middle-class
correspondents to applaud the emergence of *0ne Nation',
whose *men of both English and Dutch descent have fallen for
the same cause, in the same action'.100 From Johannesburg s
The Star there was joy that xBriton and Boer had stood
shoulder to shoulder after the South African War, and that
the races had died together at Delville Wood', while the
can* Times dubbed the Brigade's 1915 volunteers, *the true
South African nationalists, fighting for South Africa's
freedom.' Of particular note was the vigorous
assimilationist line taken by pro-war countryside papers,
several of which suggested that with Somme - inspired war
unity (^surely no room for division now'), South Africa's
two divergent parts had come together like those of
Belgium.101 In Britain, meanwhile, armchair imperialists
eagerly added their piece, declaring that Brigadier-General
Lukin's infantry had actually minted a responsible nation
out of socially and linguistically diverging tributaries of
empire. Instinctively, United Empire knew all: *what Anzac
will mean to the Australians and New Zealanders, and Ypres
to the Canadians, Delville Wood will be to the South
Africans', adding the agreeable confirmation that, xnow
loyal Britons were the same the world over'.1
Inevitably, perhaps, white public celebration of Delville
Wood as patriotic war sacrifice conveyed slightly mixed
messages, as its chorus was simultaneously Union populist
and British imperialist in character. On the one hand, in
South African Party branch speech after party branch speech,
student magazine after student magazine, weekly editorial
after weekly editorial, moderate and upstanding Cape
Afrikaners lauded the fighting qualities of *Zuid-
Afrikaners', crowing that in French eyes, South African
soldiers were among the best in the Empire, or that German
prisoners-of-war were crediting their heavy casualties to
uniquely South African fighting Qualities, the product of a
hardy and handy commando system.103 Drawing on popular
memory of the South African War, loyalist Springbok troops
were now recast in the pugnacious spirit of bitteremder,
no-surrender, commandos.
17
More weighty, though, was an anglophone patriotism which was
markedly imperial rather than merely national in scope.
Delville Wood's fire had demonstrated that when moulded by
*the power of British discipline', South African colonials
had naturally responded *as all British soldiers do'; as
xfully Britons', many had fallen *in our Empire's Cause'.104
Even common evocations of a *young South Africa' having
returned from the battlefield, *a Nation', were not fully-
articulated interpretations of an independent nation. While
men had perhaps *not fought for England', they had done so
*for the British Empire and the honour of being one of its
important Dominions'; and in so doing, they were
simultaneously ensuring South African freedom.105
For the Union's pro-war, pro-empire gentry, the proud image
of Delville Wood - a rhetorical landscape upon which white
South Africans had died united to preserve civilisation and
liberty for Dominion and Empire - became a touchstone of
loyalism. For prominent Cape liberals like John X.
Merriman, too many Afrikaners were showing too little pride
in national war achievement, and there was a vituperative,
post-Delville campaign against the Afrikaner De Burger and
Ons Vaderland. as *enemy' papers, *subsidised by German
gold'. In a provocative 17 August issue, the Cape
nationalist Burger had attributed the South African
Brigade's heavy casualties to inept British higher command.
Calls for the restricting or proscribing of dissenting anti-
war socialist and pacifist bodies, such as the South African
Peace and Arbitration Society, now also grew increasingly
shrill.106
Here and there, amidst the later 1916 epistolary din, was
the tremulous public voice of the grieving 1st Brigade
veteran, haunted by memories of fallen comrades on the
Somme, imagining that he *could wipe the place off the map
. .. its filthy wreckage of trees ... a death trap for so
many. Let us leave and be done with Delville Wood'.107
But, by the end of 1916, the Union of South Africa was
already minting the rituals and procedures *to direct human
memory' of its Somme participation *from the horrors to the
meaningfulness and glory of war'.108 In constructing its
own Great War legacy, Delville Wood would now grow to become
a battle in name and not just in fact. But that, of course,
would be another story.
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